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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Olympus has, for the most part, skirted the arguments 
made in Wasatch's opening brief* Its philosophy appears to be 
one of ignoring the lower court's errors, since it feels 
entitled to win and did. To argue that "all's well that ends 
well" may work if an error is harmless, but here the lower 
court's errors put Wasatch out of business. 
The case was based originally on the unlawful detainer 
statute. The court erred in evicting Wasatch when the statute 
no longer applied, and since whether the contract provides for 
eviction is an unresolved question of fact. 
Requiring two $300,000 supersedeas bonds was a clear 
abuse of discretion, which put Wasatch out of business pending 
this appeal. 
ARGDMENT 
1. Amendment cannot turn an unlawful detainer action 
into one at common law. Olympus' argument on this issue is 
mostly a pitch for the greater ease caused by allowing amendment 
of its unlawful detainer complaint. Olympus also argues that 
Wasatch was not prejudiced, despite the fact that commencing a 
new action would have given an opportunity for a hearing on the 
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amount owed and an opportunity to cure before eviction. There 
is no argument proffered to rebut the facts that: 
a. Jurisdiction was obtained by a complaint limited to 
statutory unlawful detainer, with a three day notice. 
b. A year passed after the three days expired. 
c. Only $17,000 was claimed as due in the three day 
notice and complaint, and more than that was paid before summary 
judgment was eventually granted a couple of years later. 
d. The judgment was based upon a letter agreement 
entered into and allegedly breached a year after the three days 
to cure expired. 
e. No eviction clause was contained in the letter 
agreement, which ran for a definite term of two years. See 
Appellant's Brief, Appendix II. 
2. This question is jurisdictional. Therefore, 
whether Wasatch was prejudiced by the court allowing the 
amendment is beside the point. 
Since the action of unlawful detainer is a special 
statutory proceeding, summary in its nature, and in derogation 
of the common law, the statute is what confers jurisdiction. 
See, Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code; 35 AmJur 2d Forcible Entry 
& Detainer § 33. 
Those statutes must therefor be strictly construed, or 
jurisdiction will fail to attach, and the proceeding will be 
- 2 -
coram non judice and void. Schroeder v. Woody, 166 Or. 93, 109 
P.2d 597, 599-600 (1941); 35 AmJur 2d Forcible Entry & Detainer 
§ 33, n. 5, and cases there cited; Color-Ad Packaging, Inc. v. 
Kapak Industries, Inc., 285 Minn. 525, 172 NW2d 568, ovrld. on 
other grounds, Township Board of Lake Valley Township v. Lewis, 
234 NW2d 815 (court without jurisdiction to enter judgment in 
unlawful detainer action where return date of summons was less 
than the three days required by statute) . 
The court in an unlawful detainer action does not 
proceed as a court of general jurisdiction, but derives its 
authority wholly from the statute. So it becomes a court of 
special and limited jurisdiction. Id. So the lower court had 
no authority to allow amendment of the action into one for 
common law restitution. Other rights, such as those sounding in 
equity, are not included in such an action. See, 35 AmJur 2d 
Forcible Entry & Detainer § 33, n. 5, and cases there cited. 
3. Execution of the letter agreement is an issue of 
fact preventing summary judgment. In the Amended Complaint 
Olympus admitted the parties entered into the letter agreement 
(11 5) , and alleged a default under that agreement (% 6) . R. 
89-92. A copy of the agreement, fully executed by both Olympus 
and Wasatch, was even attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by 
reference into the Amended Complaint. R. 92. A copy of the 
letter is attached as Appendix II to the opening brief. 
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Nevertheless, faced with the fact the letter agreement 
seems to supersede for its two year term the default provisions 
of the leasef Olympus now disputes the validity of the letter 
agreement because "the parties were never able to agree whether 
the percentage rent in paragraph 1 was monthly or annual." 
Response Br. p. 6; see also p. 13, § II. 
Of course the ambiguities (such as whether the 
percentage was annual or monthly and whether default could 
result in restitution) would be construed against Olympus since 
its predecessor in interest drafted the agreement. Hoffman v. 
Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983). But 
aside from that, the uncertainty asserted points out that issues 
of fact existed, precluding summary judgment under Rule 56, 
URCP. 
4. Effect of letter agreement is another factual 
question, precluding summary judgment. Olympus mistakenly read 
Wasatch's opening brief to allege that the letter agreement 
stated there would be no forfeiture clause. Response Br. at 13. 
Actually, Wasatch pointed out that the letter superseded the 
lease, and contained no forfeiture clause. Nor did it 
incorporate (by reference or otherwise) the forfeiture 
provisions of the lease. 
Of course Olympus asserts the remedies under the 
original lease somehow survived the letter agreement. This 
_ 4 _ 
position of Olympus requires evidence and a factual finding. A 
conflict as to the terms the parties intended to include in an 
agreement presents a factual question for the jury. Hays v. 
Underwood, 411 P.2d 717, 720-721, 196 Kan. 265 (1966). 
Moreover, the Court's Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
doesn't even state the authority for the eviction. See Appendix 
IV, Opening Brief. It appears Olympus itself is not sure 
whether its claimed entitlement to eviction is based upon 
statute, the terms of the letter agreement, the lease, or some 
common law source. This was pointed out by Wasatch in its 
opening brief. P. 3. Yet Olympus still has not cleared up the 
question. Without a forfeiture clause, Olympus' remedy was 
limited to damages. Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Utah 
1982) . 
5. The issue of partial payments also precludes 
summary judgment. Section III of Olympus' brief disputes 
whether payments it accepted from Wasatch after the letter 
agreement was signed are properly discussed on appeal. In doing 
so, Olympus unwittingly illustrates why eviction was not proper 
without a trial. Olympus states, "Wasatch occasionally made 
payments toward old obligations to Olympus. However, Wasatch 
never became current in its lease payments." Response Br. p. 
15. How can Olympus make such an admission, and deny existence 
of an issue of fact. 
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In fact/ summary judgment as to damages has now been 
sought by Olympus at the trial court level. The motion was 
heard a week ago. The question of partial payments and credits 
was so much an issue, the motion was denied (without prejudice) 
and Olympus was required to provide an accounting before 
renewing its motion. The uncertainty of the facts, and close 
correlation between eviction and damages (treated in Section 6, 
below) are again illustrated by Olympus in its brief: "If this 
court determines that, due to the remaining claims for rent and 
attorneys fees, the eviction judgment was not a final judgment 
for the purposes of executing the judgment, Olympus is willing 
to waive its claim for the rent due." Response Br. p. 18. 
6. Olympus ignores the notice issue. This was treated 
in sections 5 and 7 of Wasatch's brief. pp. 3-5. Olympus may 
not summarily evict Wasatch without complying with very specific 
statutory notices and demands. These notices must be served 
"after default". § 78-36-3(1)(c), Utah Code. No further action 
can be taken until three days "after" the notice is served. Id. 
Yet eviction was allowed here although a new agreement was 
entered into long after the original notices. No new notices 
were served after any new breach. 
7. Multiple claims were not stated. Olympus asserts 
(Br. p. 15-17) that because more than one kind of relief was 
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sought, a Rule 54(b) URCP certification of the writ of 
restitution only was permissible. However, the fact remains 
that the complaint was stated as one claim for relief. And it 
is particularly inappropriate to allow certification of part of 
the case in this instance, where the legal basis for 
restitution is far from clear. 
Even when the trial court certifies a claim under Rule 
54(b), this does not make the order appealable as a final 
decision if only a single claim is presented in the case and the 
order does not dispose of the entire case. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 47 L.Ed. 2d 435, 96 S.Ct. 1202 
(1976); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 
1, 64 L.Ed. 2d 1, 100 S.Ct. 1460 (construing the federal rules 
54(b) corollary). Here only one breach is claimed and and 
multiple remedies are sought. The identical facts apply to each 
remedy. 
While, for purposes of FRCP 54(b), a separate 
claim need not be predicated on acts entirely 
distinct from those on which other claims are 
based, there must be some variation in the facts 
required to establish each separate claim, and 
the facts underlying each claim must stated 
different legally enforceable claims which could 
have been separately enforced, since if only one 
set of facts is alleged, a mere variation in 
legal theories in insufficient to give rise to 
several claims. 
2 Fed. Proc, L. Ed. § 3:323 (authorities omitted); and see 
cases there cited. "Rule 54(b) is identical in all material 
respects to the corresponding federal rule, and in construing 
- 7 -
our rules, we look to authorities which have interpreted the 
federal rule." Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (S.Ct. 1989). 
A finding of liability which reserves the issue of 
damages is not appealable, even though the trial judge certified 
it as such. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 47 
L.Ed. 2d 435, 96 S.Ct. 1202 (1976). Certification does not 
confer jurisdiction on the Court unless a claim is actually and 
wholly disposed of. Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza 
Associates, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (S.Ct. 1989). 
Olympus challenges Wasatch (p. 17) to point to some 
reason why there is a just reason for delay. Of course throwing 
Wasatch out of its bowling alley without a determination of its 
default more than sufficient reason. In fact, the certification 
rule should be used only in an infrequent, harsh case. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360, 
32 ALR Fed. 751 (CA4 1975). There must be some danger of 
hardship or injustice through delay if the case were not 
certified for appeal. Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 
F.2d 939 (CA2 1968). Judicial policy dictates against piecemeal 
appeals. 2 Fed. Proc, L. Ed. § 3:324. 
8. Wasatch's supersedeas bond entitled it to a stay of 
execution. Wasatch argued extensively in its opening brief (pp. 
8 through 12) that the trial court erred in: 
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a. Requiring a surety of $300,000 to stay in 
possession of the bowling alley pending appeal when annual rent 
is only about $30,000, 
b. Requiring two sureties rather than one, each for 
$300,000 (the maximum amount sought by Olympus), and 
C. Failing to stay execution though one of the two 
bonds was approved. 
Yet Olympus responds in three paragraphs, merely by saying the 
court did not approve the bonds so a stay was not required. 
Response Br. pp. 18, 19. Of course this begs the question: 
should the court have refused to find the sureties were 
adequate? 
As Wasatch pointed out, the record indicates the bond 
of $300,000 was approved by the lower court. R. 243-244. This 
Olympus denies, without support or citation to the record. 
Response Br. 18. Wasatch's understanding is that the court 
refused to stay execution because a second bond was not 
approved, since the surety was unavailable for cross-examination 
on the appointed day. R. 156-159 ($50,000 bond filed), R. 
177-178 ($100,000 bond approved, subject to justification), R. 
189-193 (two $300,000 bonds filed), 205-207 (two $300,000 bonds 
required), R. 243 (court approves of bonds filed, but allows 
time for filing of corporate bonds), R. 244 (vague entry finding 
the two $300,000 bonds "acceptable" but ordering defendant to 
"post a surety bond of $300,000" or the writ of restitution 
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would be granted), R. 257 (Writ of Restitution served)* Of 
course two such bonds had already been posted. 
The record is difficult to decipher with relation to 
the bond proceedings. Since the lower court refused a stay of 
execution/ it was Olympus1 responsibility to prepare a written 
order making the judge's findings and holdings clear. It is 
impossible to tell from the minute entries exactly what occurred 
or for what reason. 
As Wasatch pointed out in its opening brief (p. 11-12)/ 
the supersedeas bond may include only such sum as will secure 
the "amount recovered for the use and determination of the 
property, the costs of the action, costs to appeal/ interest, 
and damages for delay." Former Rule 73(d)/ URCP (1984). The 
court made no findings to reach the $300/000/ a figure ten times 
the amount of a year's rent of the premises. Yet two bonds in 
that amount were required. 
9. The bankruptcy order did not affect this case. Yet 
Olympus apperas in section VI of its brief to make an argument 
akin to res judicata or collateral estoppel. Yet it does so 
without reference to any authority. Response Br. pp. 19-20. 
In the midst of the eviction/ Wasatch filed a bankruptcy 
which was later dismissed. Olympus has attached two orders of 
Bankruptcy Judge Glen E. Clark/ and has argued that they somehow 
signify a permanent termination of the leasehold independent of 
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this action. Response Br. pp. 19-20; orders attached as Exhibits 
D and E. 
It is worthy of note that the two bankrtuptcy orders 
both followed the appeal in this matter, which was filed about 
June 13, 1989. An act of the bankruptcy court cannot take 
precedence over this appeal, particularly when the issue of 
whether the lease was terminated is a state law issue. It would 
be unwise to appeal the bankruptcy decision when the same 
question is already on appeal in this Court. 
The June 28, 1989 order (Olympus1 Exhibit D) was merely 
one for temporary relief. It held "on the sole basis that 
[Olympus] will suffer irreparable and immediate injury, loss or 
damage", that Olympus could complete its state court action for 
a writ of restitution. P. 2. 
The August 8, 1989 order (Olympus' Exhibit E) simply 
observes what the trial court in this case had done: to issue of 
writ of restitution and terminate the lease. % 2, 4. Judge 
Clark is in essence deferring to the trial court judge's 
finding, not making a factual finding of his own. 
After making the observations about the state court's 
prior holdings, Judge Clark orders only "that the creditor 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. is granted relief from the 
stay to pursue its state-law remedies with respect to the 
premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes." Olympus' Exhibit 
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E, p. 3 (emphasis supplied). The language of the order 
certainly does not sound like an attempt to override the state 
court action. This appeal represents the efforts of both sides 
to pursue those state remedies. 
10. Olympus is not entitled to attorney fees. This is 
true even if the Court were to somehow find against Wasatch on 
every issue. Rule 33(a) , R. Utah Ct. App. requires a finding 
that the appeal is more than meritless. It must be frivolous. 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). It must 
have "no reasonable or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)." 
Id. It must be marked by dilatory conduct or conduct designed 
to mislead the court and which benefits only the appellant. 
Olympus has not shown (and cannot) such conduct on the part of 
Wasatch here. Olympus does make some bald assertions, without 
support by any record, of acts it believes Wasatch committed to 
"harass" Olympus. Response Br. pp. 20-21. None of the acts is 
relevant to the appeal, however. 
Wasatch believes its arguments have merit, and are 
entitled to prevail. This appeal is not a mere effort to harass 
or delay, and is brought in good faith. Sanctions for frivolous 
appeals should be applied only in egregious cases, to avoid 
chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decision. 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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CONCLUSION 
Having started as an unlawful detainer action, the 
lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in evicting Wasatch on a 
common law basis. Issues of fact remain as to whether the 
letter agreement of the parties even including an eviction 
provision. 
Separate remedies do not constitute separate causes of 
action which can be certified for a piecemeal appeal. And the 
trial court abused its discretion in requiring two $300,000 
supersedeas bonds to stay execution pending this appeal. 
Wasatch asks that the trial court's ruling be reversed, 
and that it be required to restore Wasatch to possession of the 
bowling alley. 
Respectfully so requested this 20th day of February, 
1990. 
Ronald C. Barker -—~ 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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